[Remuneration distribution - should morbidity-dependent overall remuneration also be distributed after adjustments for morbidity?]

Abstract

Introduction: In the 2009 reform of the German collective remuneration system for outpatient medical care, on the level of overall remuneration, the morbidity risk was transferred to the health funds fulfilling a long-term demand of physicians. Nevertheless not transferring morbidity adjustment to the levels of physician groups and singular practices can lead to budgets not related to patient needs and to incentives for risk selection for individual doctors.

Methods: The systematics of the distribution of overall remuneration in the German remuneration system for outpatient care are analysed focusing on the aspect of morbidity adjustment. Using diagnostic and pharmaceutical information of about half a million insured subjects, a risk adjustment model able to predict individual expenditures for outpatient care for different provider groups is presented. This model enables to additively split the individual care burden into several parts attributed to different physician groups. Conditions for the use of the model in the distribution of overall remuneration between physician groups are developed. A simulation of the use of diagnoses-based risk adjustment in standard service volumes then highlights the conditions for a successfull installation of standard service volumes representing a higher degree of risk adjustment.

Results: The presented estimation model is generally applicable for the distribution of overall remuneration to different physician groups. The simulation of standard service volumes using diagnosis-based risk adjustment does not provide a more accurate prediction of the expenditures on the level of physician practices than the age-related calculation currently used in the German remuneration system for outpatient medical care.

Conclusion: Using elements of morbidity-based risk adjustment the current German collective system for outpatient medical care could be transformed towards a higher degree of distributional justice concerning medical care for patients and more appropriate incentives avoiding risk selection. Limitations of the applicability of risk-adjustment can be especially pointed out when a high share of lump-sum-payments is used for the remuneration of some physician groups.