Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game

PLoS Comput Biol. 2023 Jun 29;19(6):e1010987. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987. eCollection 2023 Jun.

Abstract

Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model for direct reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the prisoner's dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds; in each round they decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Strategies take into account the history of the play. Memory-one strategies depend only on the previous round. Even though they are among the most elementary strategies of direct reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, much previous work has relied on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-one strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-one counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-one strategies and a full characterization for memory-one counting strategies.

Publication types

  • Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

MeSH terms

  • Biological Evolution*
  • Cooperative Behavior*
  • Game Theory
  • Humans

Grants and funding

C.H. acknowledges generous support by the European Research Council Starting grant 850529: E-DIRECT. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.